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Abstract. The assumption that detection and/or state-preparation devices used for continuous-
variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) are beyond influence of potential eavesdroppers leads to
a significant performance enhancement in terms of achievable key rate and transmission distance. We
provide a detailed and comprehensible derivation of the Holevo bound in this so-called trusted-device
scenario. Modelling an entangling-cloner attack and using some basic algebraic matrix transformations,
we show that the computation of the Holevo bound can be reduced to the solution of a quadratic
equation. As an advantage of our derivation, the mathematical complexity of our solution does not
increase with the number of trusted-noise sources. Finally, we provide a numerical evaluation of our
results, illustrating the counter-intuitive fact that an appropriate amount of trusted receiver loss and
noise can even be beneficial for the key rate.
1 Introduction
In contrast to quantum key distribution with discrete variables (DV-QKD; encoding of polarisation, phase or time-
bin of single photons), continuous-variable QKD exploits the encoding of the position and momentum quadrature
of optical Gaussian states. These can be displaced thermal states [1–5], squeezed [6] or entangled states [7]. In
particular, since coherent states can be both reliably produced at high rates and efficiently measured using standard
coherent detection, CV-QKD with displaced thermal states (i.e. noisy coherent states) is valued for its modest
technological requirements. Our recent review article [1] provides a detailed introduction into the mathematical
tools and methods required for the security analysis, noise-modelling and parameter estimation in CV-QKD. The
so-called trusted-device scenario, however, is only mentioned briefly and incompletely in the above mentioned review
(Sec. 7.3). The present manuscript is a supplement to [1] which compensates for this shortcoming.
We start with some preliminaries and definitions: Although in practical implementations of CV-QKD, the trans-
mitter (Alice, A) will prepare randomly distributed coherent states with a modulation variance Vmod using electro-
optic modulation, the standard security analysis assumes that the transmitter and the receiver (Bob, B) share a
sequence of two-mode-squeezed vacuum states (or EPR states) with variance V = Vmod + 1 (in shot-noise units,
SNU). Alice who generates these EPR states in her lab keeps one mode to herself to perform a heterodyne mea-
surement on and transmits the other one to Bob through an insecure quantum channel. We further assume that
an eavesdropper’s (Eve, E) attack on the quantum channel causes a disturbance in Bob’s mode in the shape of
an additional quadrature variance, labelled as channel excess noise ξch, and an attenuation, labelled as channel
transmittance Tch. Bob, using imperfect measurement devices, will experience further noise and attenuation which
we label as ξrec and Trec. The receiver noise ξrec might be composed of the electronic noise of the homodyne de-
tector(s), quantisation errors caused by analogue-to-digital conversion of the measurement outcomes, phase- and
intensity noise of the local oscillator and others. The receiver transmission Trec is the product of the detection and
coupling efficiency in Bob’s lab. In the trusted-receiver scenario, ξrec and Trec are well-known and calibrated and
assumed to be beyond influence of potential eavesdroppers.
Contrary to the more common notation in CV-QKD literature where the channel noise refers to the channel
input, we define it referring to the channel output, as received by Bob: ξch := Tchξch,A = ξch,B/Trec, where ξch,A
is the channel noise referring to Alice and ξch,B is the channel noise as measured by Bob. The measured variance
of Bob’s quadratures is Ttot(V − 1) + 1 + ξtot where Ttot = TchTrec and ξtot = Trecξch + ξrec or, in the presence of
preparation noise (discussed in Section 3.3), ξtot = Ttotξpr + Trecξch + ξrec.
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In continuous-variable quantum key distribution the lower bound on the asymptotic secure-key rate for reverse
reconciliation, assuming collective attacks, is described by [1, 8]
K = fsym(1− FER)(1− ν)(βIAB − χEB), (1)
where fsym is the symbol rate, FER is the frame-error rate during error correction, ν is the fraction of the raw
key consumed by parameter estimation, β is the reconciliation efficiency, IAB is the mutual information between
Alice and Bob and χEB is an upper bound for the mutual information between Eve and Bob, also referred to as
Holevo bound. In the case of Gaussian modulation of coherent states the mutual information between Alice and
Bob reads [1]
IAB =
µ
2
log2 (1 + SNR)
=
µ
2
log2
(
1 +
Ttot(V − 1)
µ+ ξtot
)
, (2)
where Ttot is the total attenuation (channel and detection), V is the variance of the two-mode-squeezed vacuum
state (in SNU) that Alice and Bob share, ξtot is the total excess noise as measured by Bob (in SNU) and µ indicates
whether homodyne detection (measurement of q or p; µ = 1) or heterodyne detection (simultaneous measurement
of q and p; µ = 2) is performed.
The Holevo bound of a CV-QKD system with reverse reconciliation is the difference between Eve’s von Neumann
entropy S before and after Bob performed a projective quadrature measurement:
χEB = SE − SE|B . (3)
In general, the von Neumann entropy is computed using
S =
∑
i
(
νi + 1
2
log2
(
νi + 1
2
)
− νi − 1
2
log2
(
νi − 1
2
))
, (4)
where νi are the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrices that describe the information accessible to Eve.
For a Gaussian state with N modes the symplectic eigenvalues correspond to the elements of the diagonalised
covariance matrix when decomposed into its Williamson form [9]:
Σ = S
N⊕
i=1
(
νi 0
0 νi
)
ST . (5)
Here S ∈ R2N×2N is a symplectic matrix, i.e. it fulfils the condition
SΩST = Ω, (6)
where Ω is the so-called symplectic form:
Ω =
N⊕
i=1
(
0 1
−1 0
)
. (7)
In general, the symplectic eigenvalues of a covariance matrix Σ correspond to the positive eigenvalues of iΩΣ.
When modelling Eve’s attack it is assumed that she purifies the state shared by Alice and Bob:
ρAB = TrE (ρABE) (8)
and the total state ρABE = |ΨABE〉 〈ΨABE | is pure. A Gaussian (multimode) state is pure if and only if its
covariance matrix has a symplectic rank R of zero. The symplectic rank is the number of symplectic eigenvalues
different from 1.
It is important to remark that for the calculation of the Holevo bound it does not make a difference how exactly
Eve purifies ρAB . This is because for any two states ρE1 and ρE2 that both purify ρAB there will be a unitary
transformation U that can transform one into the other:
(1AB ⊗ UE) |ΨABE1〉 = |ΨABE2〉 . (9)
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This ‘freedom in purification’ [10] is particularly useful since unitary transformations are entropy-preserving. Thus
we have
S(ρE1) = S(UEρE1U
†
E) = S(ρE2), (10)
or, in other words, Eve’s entropy (and therefore the Holevo bound) does not depend on the way she purifies Alice’s
and Bob’s mutual state.
In the language of Gaussian quantum information, the freedom in purification can be expressed as follows: The
covariance matrix of Alice’s and Bob’s mutual state has a symplectic rank R(ΣAB) > 0. Eve purifies the state such
that R(ΣABE) = 0 (all symplectic eigenvalues equal to one). Different purifications can always be transformed into
each other by a symplectic transformation acting on Eve’s subsystem:
(1AB ⊕ SE)ΣABE1(1AB ⊕ SE)T = ΣABE2 , (11)
leaving the entropy invariant.
In this paper we discuss two approaches to model the impact of trusted devices on the Holevo bound: The first
ansatz (Section 2) is based on the fact that for pure bipartite states the entropy is the same in both subsystems (we
will slovenly refer to this method as ‘purification ansatz’); the second ansatz (Section 3) is based on an entangling-
cloner attack. Both approaches are illustrated in Figure 1. Since in both approaches Eve purifies Alice’s and Bob’s
subsystem, they are both equivalent and lead to the same results due to the freedom in purification, as explained
above. Assuming a trusted receiver, we show that the former approach requires to find the eigenvalues of a 6 × 6
matrix whereas in the latter approach the problem is reduced to a 4× 4 matrix. Using some basic algebraic matrix
transformations, we show that the eigenvalue problem of the entangling-cloner attack can be further reduced to a
2×2 matrix, allowing for analytic expressions of manageable complexity. Furthermore, as elaborated in Section 3.3,
our approach reduces the mathematical complexity even more drastically in a trusted-receiver and -preparation
scenario.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 sketches the purification ansatz to incorporate the trusted receiver
into the security analysis. This section does not contain any novel results as it is just a review of a well-established
method; it is discussed here merely for the sake of completeness and comparison to our own method. Section 3
provides a detailed step-by-step derivation of the symplectic eigenvalues for the case of an entangling-cloner attack.
As we point out, this method always leads to quadratic equations regardless of the number of trusted-noise sources.
This allows us to derive an analytic solution for the case of trusted state preparation and receiver – a result that,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been published before. In Section 4 we perform some numerical simulations
to provide examples and illustrations on how different security assumptions affect the performance of practical
CV-QKD systems. Moreover, we discuss how deliberately detuning the receiver’s quantum efficiency can be used
to match the signal-to-noise ratio to a given error-correction code. Finally, we conclude in Section 5.
2 Purification ansatz
After purification of ρAB the total state can be seen as a pure bipartite state with Alice’s and Bob’s mutual
subsystem on one side and Eve’s subsystem on the other. As such it can be written as a Schmidt decomposition:
|ΨABE〉 =
∑
j
λj |ψi〉AB |φi〉E . (12)
Sharing the coefficients λ, both subsystems have the same entropy. Thus we have SE = SAB and SAB is obtained
from the symplectic eigenvalues of a covariance matrix of the form (e.g. derived in [1, Appendix C])
ΣAB =
(
V 12
√
T (V 2 − 1)σz√
T (V 2 − 1)σz (T (V − 1) + 1 + ξ)12
)
. (13)
If the entire transmission T and excess noise ξ are attributed to Eve, the parameters above comprise both the
contributions from the channel as well as from the receiver, i.e. T = TchTrec and ξ = Trecξch + ξrec, where ξch is the
channel noise as received by Bob.
Under the relaxed assumption that the detection devices in Bob’s lab are well calibrated and trusted, Trec
and ξrec are beyond Eve’s influence and the covariance matrix describing her von Neumann entropy before Bob’s
measurement reads
Σtrusted rec.AB =
(
V 12
√
Tch(V 2 − 1)σz√
Tch(V 2 − 1)σz (Tch(V − 1) + 1 + ξch)12
)
. (14)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1: Two different approaches to compute SE and SE|B in the trusted-receiver assumption. The purification
ansatz (a) does not make any assumptions on the particular eavesdropping attack. Eve’s interaction with
the quantum channel will modify the initial quantum state to (14). The trusted receiver is modelled by
an additional two-mode squeezed vacuum state interacting with Bob’s mode. The total state therefore
comprises four optical modes (star-shaped red sparks). A measurement of Bob’s mode will reduce the
total state to three modes, described by a 6× 6 covariance matrix. Eve is not directly represented in this
matrix. Since we assume her to hold a purification of Alice’s and Bob’s state, her conditional entropy
SE|B equals the one of the remaining total state. In the entangling-cloner ansatz (b), the channel itself is
modelled with an EPR state controlled by Eve. Receiver loss and noise are now modelled by a thermal
state. The total state now comprises five optical modes before and four modes after Bob’s projective
measurement. As opposed to the purification ansatz, Eve is now represented in the total state by her own
state EPRch. In order to compute her entropy it is sufficient to compute the eigenvalues of her subsystem,
represented by a 4× 4 matrix (as opposed to a 6× 6 matrix in the purification ansatz). We show below
how this problem can be even further reduced to dimension 2× 2.
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Depending on whether the receiver is assumed to be trusted or not, Eves entropy SE will be computed using the
matrix (14) or (13). Since both matrices are of the form
(
a12 cσz
cσz b12
)
. (15)
their symplectic eigenvalues can be obtained by [9]
ν1,2 =
1
2
(z ± [b− a]) with z =
√
(a+ b)2 − 4c2. (16)
Inserting ν1 and ν2 into (4) yields Eve’s von Neumann entropy SE .
Although in the trusted-receiver model Trec and ξrec do not contribute to SE , they still influence Bob’s measure-
ment and therefore also Eve’s entropy conditioned on Bob’s measurement. The computation of SE|B is therefore
a bit more elaborate than just omitting Trec and ξrec in the calculations (and has not been discussed in our review
paper [1]).
The purification-based approach to compute SE|B with a trusted receiver, which is in more detail described
in [11–13], assumes an unspecified eavesdropper attack on the quantum channel leading to the covariance matrix (14).
This attack assumes Eve to purify the total state. However, since in the trusted-device scenario she can only purify
the channel, the ancillary state that we use to introduce imperfect detection (to which Eve has no access to) needs to
be a pure state itself. Therefore the detector is modelled by an additional EPR state (as EPR states purify thermal
states), maintaining the purity of the total state. The imperfect detection is modelled by mixing Bob’s mode of
the shared EPR state (14) with one mode of the ancillary EPR state using a beamsplitter of transmittance Trec in
Bob’s lab, as illustrated in Figure 1(a). The total state therefore consists of four optical modes and is represented
by an 8×8 matrix. A projective quadrature measurement of Bob’s mode will reduce the total state to three modes,
i.e. a 6 × 6 covariance matrix labelled as Σtot|B . Depending on whether Bob performs heterodyne or homodyne
detection, this state is given by [1]
Σtot|B(het) = ΣA,rec − 1
VB + 1
ΣCΣ
T
C , (17a)
Σtot|B(hom) = ΣA,rec − 1
VB
ΣCΠq,pΣ
T
C , (17b)
where ΣA,rec ∈ R6×6 describes the submatrix representing Alice’s half of the initial EPR pair and the EPR pair
used to model the imperfect receiver, ΣC ∈ R6×2 is the submatrix describing the quadrature correlations of ΣA,rec
with Bob’s mode, VB is Bob’s quadrature variance and Π is a projection operator defined as
Πq =
(
1 0
0 0
)
q-measurement, Πp =
(
0 0
0 1
)
p-measurement. (18)
In the projected state Σtot|B there are no optical modes attributed to Eve. The three remaining modes are inaccessi-
ble to her. However, assuming that she purifies the total state, it is sufficient to know the entropy of Σtot|B in order
to obtain SE|B since it coincides with Eve’s entropy. This is analogous to the computation of SE where knowledge
of the matrix (13) (untrusted receiver) or (14) (trusted receiver) allows for the derivation of Eve’s entropy before
the projective measurement.
The matrix Σtot|B is of dimension 6 × 6 but can be rearranged into a block-diagonal representation of two
equivalent 3×3 matrices using similarity transformations analogous to the ones described in the subsequent section.
The eigenvalue problem can thereby be reduced to a cubic equation.
3 Entangling-cloner ansatz
This ansatz has been previously described in [1,14], however only for the scenario of an untrusted receiver. In this
approach the trusted-receiver scenario can be modelled as follows: The total state now consists of two EPR states
and a thermal state (see Figure 1(b)) which are each uniquely defined by their variance: one entangled state EPRAB
with variance V used for key exchange by Alice and Bob, one entangled state EPRch with variance Wch modelling
noise and loss in the quantum channel and a thermal state Threc with variance Wrec modelling receiver noise and
loss. Beamsplitters, one with transmission Tch and one with transmission Trec mix Bob’s mode of the initial EPR
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state with a channel mode and the thermal state, respectively. The total state before action of the beamsplitters
can be represented by the covariance matrix
Σtot,0 =

V 12
√
V 2 − 1σz 0 0 0√
V 2 − 1σz V 12 0 0 0
0 0 Wch12
√
W 2ch − 1σz 0
0 0
√
W 2ch − 1σz Wch12 0
0 0 0 0 Wrec12
 , (19)
which can be more handily written in terms of the the direct sum:
Σtot,0 = EPRAB ⊕ EPRch ⊕ Threc. (20)
We remark at this point that Eve’s attack on the quantum channel involves only the two noise- and lossless entangled
states EPRAB and EPRch and is therefore pure. Freedom in purification (as argued in the Introduction) guarantees
the equivalence to any other purification-based attack in terms of Eve’s entropy. In contrast to Sec. 2, it is therefore
sufficient to model the noisy receiver with a single-mode thermal state.
A beamsplitter located at the channel acts on Bob’s mode and the first mode of the channel EPR state; a second
beamsplitter located at the receiver acts on Bob’s mode and the thermal state modelling the receiver:
BSch =

12 0 0 0 0
0
√
Tch12
√
1− Tch12 0 0
0 −√1− Tch12
√
Tch12 0 0
0 0 0 12 0
0 0 0 0 12
 , (21a)
BSrec =

12 0 0 0 0
0
√
Trec12 0 0
√
1− Trec12
0 0 12 0 0
0 0 0 12 0
0 −√1− Trec12 0 0
√
Trec12
 . (21b)
Labelling the subsequent action of both beamsplitters as BStot = BSrecBSch, the total quantum state transforms
as follows:
Σtot = BStot Σtot,0 BS
T
tot. (22)
We omit writing down the resulting 10× 10 matrix which is rather bulky and little illuminating. Instead, we first
concentrate on the subsystem shared by Alice and Bob, i.e. the first two rows and columns of Σtot (four if the block
matrices 12 and σz are expanded):
ΣAB =
(
V 12
√
Tch
√
Trec
√
V 2 − 1σz√
Tch
√
Trec
√
V 2 − 1σz (TchTrecV + (1− Tch)TrecWch + (1− Trec)Wrec)12
)
(23)
Now, defining the variances of the EPR states such that
Wch =
ξch
1− Tch + 1, (24a)
Wrec =
ξrec
1− Trec + 1, (24b)
the variance of Bob’s mode becomes
VB(q) = VB(p) = TchTrec(V − 1) + 1 + Trecξch + ξrec
= TchTrec(V − 1) + 1 + ξch,B + ξrec (25)
and the covariance matrix (23) reads
ΣAB =
(
V 12
√
Ttot
√
V 2 − 1σz√
Ttot
√
V 2 − 1σz (Ttot(V − 1) + 1 + ξtot)12
)
, (26)
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which is consistent with (13).
On the other hand, extracting from Σtot the two modes belonging to Eve, we obtain
ΣE =
(
((1− Tch)V + TchWch)12
√
Tch
√
W 2ch − 1σz√
Tch
√
W 2ch − 1σz Wch12
)
. (27)
This matrix is of the shape (15), and therefore its symplectic eigenvalues can be computed by (16). As can be
verified, its entropy SE coincides with the one shared by Alice and Bob, obtained from their mutual covariance
matrix under loose assumptions (14) which is exactly what we expect to see when Eve holds a purification of Alice’s
and Bob’s state:
SE := S(ΣE) = S(Σ
trusted rec.
AB ) =: SAB . (28)
Now, in order to obtain SE|B we first need to compute Σtot|B , hence the total state of the remaining modes after
a projective measurement of Bob’s mode. We first rearrange Σtot such that Bob’s mode is represented in the last
row and column. This can be done using the permutation matrix
P3,4→9,10 =

12 0 0 0 0
0 0 12 0 0
0 0 0 12 0
0 0 0 0 12
0 12 0 0 0
 (29)
which will permute the third and fourth row (column) to the bottom (right) when multiplied with Σtot from the
front (back):
Σ′tot = P3,4→9,10 Σtot P
T
3,4→9,10. (30)
Since P3,4→9,10PT3,4→9,10 = 1, the above permutation is a similarity transformation and therefore leaves the eigen-
values of Σtot invariant. The rearranged matrix is now of the form
Σ′tot =
(
ΣA,ch,rec ΣC
ΣTC ΣB
)
, (31)
where ΣA,ch,rec ∈ R8×8 describes Alice’s mode and the two EPR states modelling the channel and the receiver,
ΣB ∈ R2×2 is Bob’s mode and ΣC ∈ R8×2 describes the mutual quadrature correlations between ΣA,ch,rec and ΣB .
The partial matrix after a projective measurement of Bob’s mode depends on whether Bob performs heterodyne or
homodyne detection.
3.1 Heterodyne detection
In the case of heterodyne detection of Bob’s mode, the remaining modes are projected into the state described by
the 8× 8 matrix
Σtot|B = ΣA,ch,rec − 1
VB + 1
ΣCΣ
T
C . (32)
Again, it is not necessary to evaluate the entire resulting matrix. Instead we only calculate the block matrix that
describes Eve’s information, i.e. the two modes representing the EPR state that was used to model the channel
noise and transmission. This matrix reads
ΣE|B =
1
VB + 1
(
e112 e2σz
e2σz e312
)
(33)
with
e1 = V ((1− Trec)Wrec + TrecWch + 1) + Tch(Wch − V ) (1 + (1− Trec)Wrec) , (34a)
e2 =
√
Tch (W 2ch − 1) (TrecV + (1− Trec)Wrec + 1) , (34b)
e3 = (1− Trec)WchWrec + TrecTch(VWch − 1) + Trec +Wch, (34c)
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and VB is given by (25). Since the above matrix ΣE|B is again of the form (15) we obtain the symplectic eigenvalues
ν3 and ν4 by using (16):
ν3,4 =
z ± (e3 − e1)
2(VB + 1)
with z =
√
(e1 + e3)2 − 4e22. (35)
As can be verified, this result coincides with the one from [12] which was obtained using the purification ansatz.
3.2 Homodyne detection
In the case of homodyne detection of Bob’s mode, the remaining modes are projected into the state
Σtot|B = ΣA,ch,rec − 1
VB
ΣCΠq,pΣ
T
C . (36)
As in the heterodyne case, we extract from this matrix the two modes controlled by Eve, described by the submatrix
ΣE|B . Depending on whether a q- or p-measurement has been performed, Eve’s state after homodyne measurement
of Bob’s mode reads:
ΣE|B(q) =

e1 0 e2 0
0 e3 0 e4
e2 0 e5 0
0 e4 0 e6
 , ΣE|B(p) =

e3 0 −e4 0
0 e1 0 −e2
−e4 0 e6 0
0 −e2 0 e5
 (37)
with
e1 = V +
1
VB
Tch(Wch − V ) (TrecV + (1− Trec)Wrec) , (38a)
e2 =
1
VB
√
Tch(W 2ch − 1) (TrecV + (1− Trec)Wrec) , (38b)
e3 = V + Tch (Wch − V ) , (38c)
e4 = −
√
Tch (W 2ch − 1), (38d)
e5 = Wch − 1
VB
(1− Tch)Trec
(
W 2ch − 1
)
, (38e)
e6 = Wch. (38f)
Since a projective homodyne measurement affects the q- and p-quadratures of the remaining modes differently,
ΣE|B has now to be described by six independent components, as opposed to only three components in the case of
heterodyne detection. Moreover, as this matrix is not similar to (15), we need to compute the symplectic eigenvalues
by hand. We recall that the symplectic eigenvalues of ΣE|B are the positive eigenvalues of iΩ2ΣE|B where Ω2 is
given by (7). This leads to the expression (depending on whether a q- or p-measurement has been performed)
ΣE|B,sympl(q) = i

0 e3 0 e4
−e1 0 −e2 0
0 e4 0 e6
−e2 0 −e5 0
 , ΣE|B,sympl(p) = i

0 e1 0 −e2
−e3 0 e4 0
0 −e2 0 e5
e4 0 −e6 0
 . (39)
The matrix ΣE|B,sympl(p) is related to the transpose of ΣE|B,sympl(q) by the similarity transformation
ΣE|B,sympl(p) = diag(−1, 1, 1,−1)ΣE|B,sympl(q)T diag(−1, 1, 1,−1) (40)
and therefore has the same eigenvalues. Thus, we can omit the separate consideration of q- and p-measurement
in the following derivation. We now square ΣE|B,sympl(q) (keeping in mind that that the eigenvalues of a squared
matrix are just its squared eigenvalues):
Σ2E|B,sympl(q) =

e1e3 + e2e4 0 e2e3 + e4e5 0
0 e1e3 + e2e4 0 e1e4 + e2e6
e1e4 + e2e6 0 e2e4 + e5e6 0
0 e2e3 + e4e5 0 e2e4 + e5e6
 . (41)
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The advantage of squaring ΣE|B,sympl(q) is that the above matrix can now be brought into a block-diagonal form
by rearranging the rows and columns. In particular, swapping the second and third column and row using the
permutation matrix
P2↔3 =

1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
 (42)
yields the expression
P2↔3 Σ2E|B,sympl(q) P2↔3 =

e1e3 + e2e4 e2e3 + e4e5 0 0
e1e4 + e2e6 e2e4 + e5e6 0 0
0 0 e1e3 + e2e4 e1e4 + e2e6
0 0 e2e3 + e4e5 e2e4 + e5e6
 =: ( E 00 ET
)
.
(43)
(Since P2↔3P2↔3 = 1 the operation above is another similarity transformation and therefore does not affect the
eigenvalues.) The eigenvalues of a block-diagonal matrix are the union of the eigenvalues of the individual blocks.
This particular problem is even more simplified by the observation that the two blocks of each matrix are transposes
of each other and therefore have the same eigenvalues. So the whole problem is reduced to finding the eigenvalues of
one 2× 2 matrix. The square roots of these eigenvalues represent the eigenvalues of ΣE|B,sympl which always occur
in pairs ±νi. The symplectic eigenvalues of ΣE|B that we need for computation of SE|B are the positive eigenvalues
of ΣE|B,sympl and given by
ν3,4 =
1√
2
√
E11 + E22 ±
√
(E11 − E22)2 + 4E12E21. (44)
Again, these results are equivalent to the ones obtained by the purification ansatz [11,12].
3.3 Trusted preparation noise
The above derivation of the Holevo bound is particularly handy when not only receiver loss and noise but also prepa-
ration noise is considered to be trusted [13]. Preparation noise may be composed of laser phase noise and imperfect
quadrature modulation [15]. Trusted preparation was first modelled using the purification-based method [16, 17]
and later by an entangling-cloner [18]. Similar to the channel and receiver noise, we model the preparation noise
using an additional thermal state Thpr with variance
Wpr =
ξpr
1− Tpr + 1, (45)
where ξpr is the preparation noise in shot-noise units as produced by Alice. The preparation noise as measured by
Bob will then be ξpr,B = TchTrecξpr. The thermal state Thpr will be interfered with Bob’s mode using a beamsplitter
of transmission Tpr → 1 (since imperfect preparation does, in contrast to the channel and receiver, not introduce
optical attenuation). Although the limit Tpr → 1 will lead to Wpr → ∞, the mode reflected into the channel will
be (1− Tpr)Wpr = ξpr + 1− Tpr → ξpr and is therefore finite and well-defined.
Using the purification ansatz, the entropy SE has to be obtained by the symplectic eigenvalues of a 12 × 12
matrix, describing 6 optical modes: Alice’s and Bob’s modes and the two modes of Wpr and Wrec, respectively (see
Figure 2(a)). Computation of SE|B requires the symplectic eigenvalues of a 10 × 10 matrix, describing 5 optical
modes, i.e. the total state minus Bob’s mode which was measured by heterodyne or homodyne detection. Finding
the eigenvalues of this matrix is therefore related to solving a fifth-degree polynomial.
In contrast, using the derivation based on the entangling-cloner attack analogous to the previous section, the
problem can again be remodelled to an investigation of merely the two modes accessible to Eve (see Figure 2(b)),
reducing the eigenvalue problem to a second-degree polynomial. This allows us to describe trusted preparation and
detection noise by analytical expressions of limited complexity.
The total initial state now includes the EPR state responsible for preparation noise:
Σtot,0 = EPRAB ⊕ Thpr ⊕ EPRch ⊕ Threc. (46)
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(a)
(b)
Figure 2: Security analysis under trusted receiver and state preparation using (a) the purification and (b) the
entangling-cloner ansatz. For the purification ansatz we need to model the preparation noise with an
additional entangled state EPRpr whereas in the entangling-cloner approach it is sufficient to use a thermal
state Thpr with variance Wpr = ξpr/(1− Tpr) + 1. Although the total state is extended by one additional
mode, the mathematical complexity of the security analysis using the entangling-cloner ansatz does not
increase significantly since we still only compute the eigenvalues of Eve’s subsystem (represented by a
4× 4 matrix which can again be reduced to dimension 2× 2 using the transformations described above).
The total beamsplitting operator is now BStot = BSrecBSchBSpr. After the transformation
Σtot = BStot Σtot,0 BS
T
tot (47)
we extract the block matrix describing Eve’s modes and set Tpr = 1. This yields
ΣE =
(
((1− Tch)(V + ξpr) + TchWch)12
√
Tch
√
W 2ch − 1σz√
Tch
√
W 2ch − 1σz Wch12
)
, (48)
which, consistently, is identical to (27) after the substitution V → V + ξpr. The symplectic eigenvalues ν1 and ν2
needed for SE are again obtained by (16). In order to compute ν3 and ν4, as required for SE|B , we again build the
partial covariance matrix of the total state after a projective heterodyne (17a) or homodyne (17b) measurement of
Bob’s mode and then extract the block matrix describing Eve’s modes.
After setting Tpr = 1 Eve’s covariance matrix conditioned on Bob’s measurement is of the form (33) in the case
of heterodyne detection and of the form (37) in the case of homodyne detection. Moreover the elements of ΣE|B,het
and ΣE|B,hom are identical to (34) (heterodyne) and (38) (homodyne) except for the substitution V → V + ξpr.
The symplectic eigenvalues ν3 and ν4 are again obtained by (35) (heterodyne), or by (44) (homodyne), respectively.
Numerical evaluation of our analytical equations yields a convincing accordance with the numerical results obtained
by the purification ansatz [13].
4 Numerical evaluation
Using our CV-QKD simulation tool ‘CVsim’ [19], we were able to conduct a thorough study of trusted receiver
and state preparation and their implication on experimental implementations. Figure 3 indicates the performance
difference in terms of the achievable key rate and channel length depending on whether preparation and/or receiver
are trusted. Figures 4(a) and (b) illustrate the key rate with respect to trusted receiver noise and loss, parametrised
by channel noise and channel length. Interestingly, these graphs exhibit a non-monotonous behaviour, indicating
that the trusted-receiver assumption does not only render device imperfections less harmful; even more, trusted
receiver loss and noise can actually be used to increase the key rate [13, 20, 21]. This is possible when Trec and
ξrec decrease the Holevo information χEB more than they decrease the mutual information IAB . This effect,
first observed in DV-QKD [22] and sometimes described by ‘fighting noise with noise’ [23] is only possible in the
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: (a) Secure-key rate r with respect to channel length l under different security assumptions for an exemplary
set of experimental parameters. The assumed fibre loss is 0.2 dB/km and Vmod := V −1 has been optimised
to maximise the key rate for each individual point in the graph. (b) Code rate R := βIAB (solid) and
Holevo bound χEB (dashed) for the same parameters. The key rate r becomes zero where R ≤ χEB .
(In this figure and all subsequent plots we assume zero frame errors and neglect disclosure of samples for
parameter estimation.)
(a) (b)
Figure 4: Secure key r with respect to (a) trusted receiver noise ξrec and (b) trusted detection efficiency Trec.
The graphs are non-monotonous, indicating that under certain conditions a certain amount of noise and
detection inefficiency can actually be beneficial for the achievable key rate.
11
Figure 5: Secure key r with respect to trusted (solid) and untrusted (dashed) preparation noise ξpr, parametrised
by channel length l. Receiver noise and loss are trusted.
(a) (b)
Figure 6: Using trusted receiver loss to keep the SNR constant. This is relevant when one LDPC code (in this
example matched to an exemplary SNR of 1) is used for different channel distances. (a) Comparison of
secure key vs. channel distance for: key-maximising modulation variance (solid), adjusted Vmod to satisfy
SNR = 1 (dotted) and optimised Vmod and Trec to maximise the key rate under the condition SNR = 1
(dashed). (b) Modulation variance Vmod for the same three cases under the same experimental parameter
set. The red dashed line refers to the right y-axis and illustrates the tuning of Trec to maximise the key
while satisfying SNR = 1.
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trusted-receiver scenario where imperfect detection increases the conditional entropy SE|B but leaves the entropy
SE invariant. Figure 5 illustrates the secure-key rate with respect to trusted and untrusted preparation noise for
different channel lengths.
As a further consideration, deliberately detuning the receiver’s trusted quantum efficiency Trec can become relevant
in the practical case where the error-correcting code (usually low-density parity-check, LDPC) is optimised to a
particular signal-to-noise ratio. If one and the same LDPC code is supposed to be used for different channel
distances then Alice and Bob will need to keep the SNR constant with respect to channel loss. This can be
achieved in a straightforward manner by tuning the modulation variance Vmod accordingly, or alternatively, by
adjusting Vmod and Trec. Figure 6(a) compares the key rate over channel length for an exemplary parameter set
in three cases: (1) modulation variance optimised to maximise the secure key, irregardless of the SNR (solid),
(2) modulation variance adjusted to keep the SNR constant at 1 (dotted) and (3) modulation variance and receiver
efficiency optimised to maximise the key rate and, at the same time, satisfy SNR = 1 (dashed). We observe (for
this particular parameter set) a slight improvement in terms of accessible channel length when Trec is deliberately
detuned. Figure 6(b) compares the modulation variance for each of these cases and illustrates the optimal quantum
efficiency Trec under the condition of a constant SNR.
Certainly enough, the more common procedure is to adapt the LDPC code for forward error correction to a certain
SNR level corresponding to the link. In order to match the code rate accurately to the SNR in the presence of
fluctuations, techniques like puncturing and shortening are usually used [24,25]. Our proposal to deliberately reduce
the detection efficiency can be seen as an alternative way of code-rate matching. We emphasise the observation
that varying Vmod and Trec (Fig. 6(a), dashed blue) allows us to implement one LDPC code, matched to a constant
SNR, that can produce a secure key with no distance penalty compared to codes that are matched to the ‘natural’
SNR corresponding to the respective channel length (Fig. 6, solid blue). This is in contrast to adapting the code
itself which comes at the cost of a reduced reconciliation efficiency β. Especially at long distances even a slight
decrease of β can reduce the secret fraction r ∼ βIAB − χEB to the negative regime.
From an application point of view, adjusting the SNR by increasing the trusted detector loss or, alternatively,
the trusted receiver noise [26] can become relevant when experimental requirements demand for more flexibility
in terms of the SNR. For instance, these may include the implementation of different security assumptions (and
correspondingly adapted signal powers) at one and the same link, dynamic switching between homodyne and
heterodyne detection, field tests and multi-node networks with different distances.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we demonstrated and derived in detail an efficient way to compute the Holevo bound in continuous-
variable quantum key distribution under the assumption of trusted receiver and state preparation. In particular, we
showed that the eigenvalue problem that needs to be solved in order to obtain the Holevo bound can be reduced to a
second-degree polynomial, regardless of the total system’s complexity. This allowed us to find analytical expressions
for Eve’s entropy and conditional entropy under the assumption of trusted receiver and state preparation. Finally,
we performed numerical simulations to illustrate the impact of various trusted-device assumptions on practical CV-
QKD implementations, highlighting the fact that under particular circumstances the key rate can even be increased
by an appropriate amount of trusted receiver loss and noise.
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